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This paper studies optimal contracting under synergies. We define influence as the extent to which
effort by one agent reduces a colleague's marginal cost of effort, and synergy to be the sum of the (unidimensional)
influence parameters across a pair of agents. In a two-agent model, effort levels are equal even if influence
is asymmetric. The optimal effort level depends only on total synergy and not individual influence
parameters. An increase in synergy raises total effort and total pay, consistent with strong equity incentives
in small firms, including among low-level employees. The influence parameters matter only for individual
pay. Pay is asymmetric, with the more influential agent being paid more, even though the level and
productivity of effort are both symmetric. With three agents, effort levels differ and are higher for
more synergistic agents. An increase in the synergy between two agents can lead to the third agent
being excluded from the team, even if his productivity is unchanged. This has implications for optimal
team composition and firm boundaries. Agents that influence a greater number of colleagues receive



















Most work is conducted in teams. In these teams, agents' actions are typically syner-
gistic { eort by one agent reduces the cost of eort for his colleague. For example,
going on an international business trip is less costly to a manager if she has an ecient
secretary; it is easier for a divisional manager to implement a new workforce practice if
the CEO has developed a corporate culture that embraces change. Synergies are also
important in non-corporate settings { the cost of giving an academic seminar is lower
if one's coauthor has worked hard to improve the quality of the paper.
The structure of synergies within a team is complex. Within a given team, the
contributions of each agent to the collective synergy are typically asymmetric. A CEO
has a greater impact on the working environment of a divisional manager (through
his choice of organizational structure, corporate culture, and communication policies)
than the other way round; a conversation between a senior faculty member and a junior
colleague usually benets the latter more than the former. Moreover, the number of
synergistic relationships that an agent will enjoy may vary across agents. A CEO
likely exhibits synergies with each of his divisional managers, but a pair of divisional
managers might not exhibit synergies with each other.
This paper studies an optimal contracting problem in the presence of such syn-
ergies. In our theory, agents contribute to the production of a joint project, which
either succeeds or fails. We model synergies as follows. Inuence refers to the extent
to which eort by one agent reduces the marginal cost of eort of a colleague, and
synergy between a pair of agents is the sum of the (unidirectional) inuence parame-
ters of the two agents. With more than two agents, a multidimensional synergy prole
captures the synergies between all pairs of agents. Our framework allows for eort to
be continuous, inuence to be asymmetric across a given pair of agents, and agents to
dier in the number of colleagues with whom they enjoy synergies and in the strength
of these synergies. The model also allows for the production function to exhibit either
complements or substitutes in the agents' eort levels, and shows that the eects of
synergies are robust to the choice of production function.
Our analysis solves for the eect of synergies on the optimal eort level of each
agent, the wage paid to a given agent if the project succeeds (both in absolute terms
and relative to his colleagues), and the total wages paid out by the rm to all agents
upon success. In particular, it addresses several questions that cannot be explored
in a single-agent framework, such as the determinants of cross-sectional dierences in
pay across agents within the same rm, and the optimal composition of a team or
2boundaries of a rm. While standard models study how eort and pay depend on
productivity and risk aversion, we study the eect of synergy.
We start with a two-agent model in which agents' eorts are perfect substitutes,
i.e. the probability of project success depends on the sum of their actions. Even
though the agents' inuence can be asymmetric, and so one agent's eort is more
\productive" in that it reduces his colleague's marginal cost more than his colleague's
eort reduces his cost, the principal wants both agents to exert the same eort level.
While the colleague's eort is less \productive", which would normally suggest that
he should exert a lower eort level, the synergies arising from the rst agent's action
make it easier for the principal to induce eort from his colleague, and so she wishes the
colleague to exert a similarly high level of eort. This result in the specic two-person
model illustrates a more general point of the model (for any number of agents) { while
inuence parameters are individual and may be asymmetric across agents, the synergy
is common to a group of agents. It is the common synergy, not the individual inuence
parameters, that determines the optimal eort level.
However, while eort levels are symmetric, wages are not. The more inuential
agent receives a higher wage upon success. Since the agent is paid zero upon failure,
a higher success wage represents both higher incentives and a higher level of expected
pay. This asymmetry in the wage occurs even though both agents exert the same eort
level (and so pay is not simply a \compensating dierential" for the disutility of eort),
and eort by each agent has an identical eect on the production function. Instead,
higher pay is optimal because it causes the agent to internalize the externalities he
exerts on his colleague. When choosing his eort level, each agent takes his colleague's
action as given, and so he does not take into account the impact on his colleague's cost
of eort. A higher wage causes him to internalize this synergy, and so leads him to
exerting the optimal level of eort.
An increase in the overall level of synergies between the agents leads to the principal
implementing a higher eort level, and paying out higher total wages in the case of
success. This result contrasts standard principal-agent models without synergies, in
which total wages are independent of productivity parameters in the presence of risk
neutrality. If an agent is more productive, the principal wishes to implement a higher
level of eort (which requires steeper incentives, ceteris paribus), but greater produc-
tivity means that atter incentives are required to implement a given level of eort,
and these two eects exactly oset. In our model, the second eect is absent because
synergy only aects cost functions and not an agent's marginal eect on production,
3and so an increase in synergy unambiguously leads to higher total wages. The result is
consistent with the high level of equity incentives in start-up rms, including to rank-
and-le employees with little direct eect on rm output. Standard principal-agent
theory suggests it is never optimal to give equity incentives to a low-level employee as
he has little eect on the equity price and so equity would merely subject him to risk
outside his control. However, particularly in start-up rms where job descriptions are
blurred and workers interact frequently with each other, agents can have a signicant
indirect eect on rm value through aiding their colleagues. In addition, in small rms
with a shallower hierarchy, a junior employee is more likely to interact with a senior
colleague.
An increase in agent i's inuence parameter, holding agent j's inuence parameter
constant, raises total synergies and so increases total eort and total wages as explained
above. Agent i's wage always increases, but the eect on agent j's wage is more
nuanced. It increases if and only if his inuence parameter is above a critical threshold,
otherwise it decreases. The intuition is as follows. The principal could choose to hold
agent j's wage constant, in which case an increase in i's inuence parameter raises
j's eort level because it reduces his marginal cost of eort. Thus, the principal could
reduce agent j's wage slightly without his eort falling below its previous level. If agent
j's inuence is suciently low, his eort is less benecial to the team than agent i's
eort. Then, the principal prefers to extract some of the surplus (created by agent j's
lower cost of eort) and reinvest it in agent i. This is achieved by lowering agent j's
wage, accepting a lower increase in his eort, and reinvesting a portion of the saved
cash to further increase agent i's wage. By contrast, if agent j's inuence is suciently
high, the principal chooses to reinforce the increase in j's eort level by augmenting his
wage. An increase in agent i's relative inuence { augmenting his inuence parameter
but decreasing agent j's to keep the total synergy constant { causes agent i's wage to
increase in both absolute terms, and relative to agent j. In short, synergy determines
the (common) eort level and total pay, and inuence determines the agents' relative
pay.
While the two-agent model xes some basic ideas in a parsimonious manner, the
core analysis of the paper is a three-agent model which allows us to study dierences
in the scope of synergies exerted by agents { such as the earlier example whereby a
CEO inuences two divisional managers, but the divisional managers do not inuence
each other. The \synergy component" refers to the sum of the bilateral inuence
parameters between a given pair of agents: i.e. agent i's inuence on agent j, plus
4agent j's inuence of agent i. There are three synergy components, one for each pair
of agents. If the synergy components are suciently close to each other, all agents
exert strictly positive eort, and the ratio of the eort (and thus wage) levels depends
on the relative magnitude of all three synergy components. For example, if agent 1
exhibits more synergies with agent 3 than does agent 2, then agent 1 will exert a higher
eort level than agent 2. This contrasts the two-agent case, where both agents take the
same action. Note that the relative eort levels depend on the total synergies between
each pair of agents, rather than the unidirectional inuence parameters. It may seem
that the optimal eort level exerted by agent 1 should depend only on his inuence on
agent 3, and not 3's inuence on 1, since only the former aects the productivity of
his eort. However, if 3 has a greater inuence on 1, it is less costly for the principal
to induce eort from 1, and so the optimal eort level depends on the total synergy.
As in the two-agent model, the optimal eort levels depend on the collective synergy,
rather than the individual inuence parameters; the latter only aect relative pay.
A natural application of the three-agent model is a setting where one synergy com-
ponent is close to zero { for example, if two divisional managers exhibit synergies with
the CEO but less so with each other { then the two non-synergistic agents can be
aggregated into a single employee and the model reduces to a close variant of the two-
agent case. Thus, the CEO exerts almost the same eort level as the two divisional
managers combined, and so his level of pay is also higher than each divisional manager.
Bebchuk, Cremers and Peyer (2011) interpret a high level of CEO pay compared to
other senior managers as inecient rent extraction, but we show that it can be optimal
given the broad scope of a CEO's activities. In addition, this result suggests that the
optimal measure of rm size that determines CEO pay, in assignment models such as
Gabaix and Landier (2008) and Tervi o (2008), may not be an accounting measure such
as assets or prots (as typically used in empirical studies), but the scope of a CEO's
inuence. The CEO of a large rm where divisions operate independently (such as a
conglomerate) may be paid less than the manager of a small synergistic rm, such as
a start-up.
If one synergy component becomes suciently large compared to the other two, then
the model collapses to the two-agent setting. Intuitively, if the synergy between two
agents is suciently strong, then only these two agents matter for the principal { she
ignores the third agent and induces zero eort from him, even though he has the same
direct eect on the production function as the rst two agents. This also means that the
third agent's participation depends on circumstances outside his control { in contrast
5to standard models in which an agent's eort level depends only on parameters specic
to him. Even if his own synergy parameters do not change, if the synergy component
between his two colleagues suddenly increases, this can lead to him being excluded.
This is because the increased synergy between his colleagues raises the value of the
rm, and thus the cost of giving the third agent equity to induce eort. This result
has interesting implications for the optimal composition of a team { if two agents
enjoy suciently high synergies with each other, there is no gain in adding a third
agent, even if he has just as high a direct impact on the production function as the
rst two. Similarly, if the agents are interpreted as divisions of a rm, the model has
implications for the boundaries of a rm and suggests which divisions should be added,
divested or retained. Conventional wisdom suggests that a division should be divested
only if it does not exhibit synergies with the rest of the conglomerate. However, here,
even if a division enjoys strictly positive synergies, it should still be divested if its
synergies are lower than those enjoyed by the other divisions { i.e. it is relative, not
absolute, synergies that matter for the boundaries of the rm. Similarly, a rm should
not automatically acquire a target even if it will generate strictly positive synergies in
absolute terms.
We nally consider a model of perfect complements, where the success probability
depends only on the minimum eort level across all agents. Even though the production
function is a polar opposite, the model's core results remain robust. An increase in
total synergy augments the eort levels and pay of all agents; a rise in the relative
inuence of a single agent raises his pay in both relative and absolute terms.
Our study builds on the literature on multi-agent principal-agent problems. Holm-
strom (1982) considers two team-based settings. Where agents contribute to a joint
output, a free-rider problem exists. Where each agent has his own output measure,
the principal can use relative performance evaluation to reduce the noise in evaluating
each agent. There are no synergies in his model: eort by one agent has no eect on
the marginal productivity or marginal cost of another agent's eort. In the individual-
output model, there is no interaction between the agents; in the joint-output model, the
only interaction stems from a joint production function in which the eorts are perfect
substitutes rather than exhibiting complementarities. A rich literature, summarized
by Bolton and Dewatripont (2005, Chapter 8), has built on both of these settings, ana-
lyzing further interesting questions such as the possibility of collusion between agents,
mutual monitoring between agents, and the optimal structuring of a team into hierar-
chies, but do not consider synergies. Itoh (1991) studies a multi-tasking problem where
6agents take two actions: one increases their own output, and another increases his col-
league's output. This contrasts our setting where there is a single output across the
team, and each agent takes a single action which both improves the joint output and
reduces his colleague's marginal cost { thus, the productive action is also synergistic
and the contract must change to force the agent to internalize this externality. Some of
the subsequent literature on team-based incentives has focused on the free-rider prob-
lem in settings that involve complementarities in the production function under a joint
output. Che and Yoo (2001) extend the free-rider problem to a repeated setting, where
an agent can threaten to punish a shirking colleague by shirking himself in a future
period. Kremer (1993) studies the case of extreme complementarities in production,
when failure in one agent's task leads to automatic failure of the joint project, although
agents do not make an eort decision. Winter (2004) extends this framework to incor-
porate a binary eort choice and shows that it may be optimal to give agents dierent
incentive schemes even if they are ex ante homogenous. Extending this framework
further, Winter (2006) studies how the optimal contract depends on the sequencing of
agents' actions, and Winter (2010) shows how it depends on the information agents
have about each other. Gervais and Goldstein (2007) analyze optimal contracting in
a model with production complementarities and agents with self-perception biases.
Sakovics and Steiner (2011) study optimal subsidies where there are complementarities
in production.
We show in the paper that complementarities in the production function are in-
herently dierent from the synergies studied in our paper. In our paper, eort by one
agent reduces the marginal cost of eort of his colleague. This can also be interpreted
as an agent's eort increasing the marginal private benet of eort by his colleague {
for example, giving an academic seminar is more enjoyable if one's coauthor has worked
hard on the paper. Regardless of whether we interpret an agent's eort as aecting
his colleague's private cost or private benet, the agent does not take into account
this externality when making his eort decision, and has to be compensated dierently
to internalize it. On the other hand, in models with complementarities in the pro-
duction function, the agent does internalize the eect his eort has on his colleagues'
productivity, because he receives a share of the output. Thus, when the production
complementarity increases, the agent will raise his eort level even if the contract is
held constant { the contract does not need to change to cause him to internalize his ex-
ternality. In a single-agent model, modifying the production function is isomorphic to
modifying the cost function; in a multi-agent model, complementarities in production
7are fundamentally dierent from complementarities in costs.
Of closest relevance to our paper are other models of contracting with externalities.
Kandel and Lazear (1992) study peer pressure, whereby an agent's eort aects the
utility of other agents. Their focus is on demonstrating how to model a peer pressure
situation, rather than solving for the optimal contract. In Segal (1999), agents exert
externalities on each other through their impact on other agents' reservation utilities
rather than cost functions. The agents' actions are observable participation decisions
(e.g. the decision to buy a product) rather than the choice of an unobservable eort
level; there is no output or production function as in this paper. Studying the optimal
eort choice (out of a continuum) rather than a zero-one participation decision leads
to several new results, such as the eect of total synergy on the optimal eort level,
that eorts may be symmetric even if inuence is asymmetric, and that the optimal
eort level of an agent may be zero even if he enjoys strictly positive synergies. In
addition, while we focus on the optimal contract, Segal's focus is on what outcomes are
achievable and the bulk of the analysis concerns symmetric externalities. Bernstein and
Winter (2010) also focus on a participation decision, as in Segal (1999), and study the
case of heterogeneity in externalities. Dessein, Garicano, and Gertner (2010) study the
optimal allocation of tasks under economies of scale, which they refer to as synergies.
This is a dierent concept from the synergy in our paper, where eort by one agent
reduces the cost of eort of another agent.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the most general version of the
model, which we then specialize to a perfect substitutes production function in Section
3. We start with the preliminary two-agent model and then move to the core three-
agent model. Section 4 analyzes a perfect complements production function and shows
that the core results are robust, and Section 5 concludes. Appendix A contains all
proofs not in the main text.
2 The Generic Model
This section outlines our general synergy model. Section 3 later specializes the model
to the case where agents' outputs are substitutes, and Section 4 considers the case of
complements.
There is a risk-neutral principal (\rm"), and N risk-neutral agents (\workers")
indexed i = 1;2;:::N. Each agent is protected with limited liability and has a reser-
8vation utility of zero. Each agent exerts an unobservable eort level
pi 2 [0;1] i = 1;2;:::N:
The agents' eorts aect the rm's output. The rm has two possible output levels,
r 2 f0;1g. The output level is publicly observable and contractible. We will sometimes
refer to r = 1 as \success" and r = 0 as \failure". The probability of success depends
on eort levels p of all agents as follows:
Pr(r = 1) = P(p1;p2;:::pN): (1)
Each agent's cost of eort ci (p) depends not only on his own eort level pi, but
also the eort levels exerted by all other agents. We specify agent i's cost function as:







i = 1;2;:::N; (2)
where





The variable "ij is an inuence parameter that represents the inuence agent i exerts
on agent j. The higher the inuence parameter, the greater the extent to which eort
by agent i reduces the cost of eort of agent j. A central feature of our model reected
in (2) is that the eort by agent i reduces the marginal cost of eort by agent j. This
is the source of the synergistic relations among agents in our model: when an agent
exerts more eort, he makes it less costly for other agents to exert more eort as well.
We will sometimes refer to hi (pi) as agent i's individual cost function, to distinguish it
from the \all-in" cost function ci (p). The inuence parameters "ij and the individual
cost functions hi (pi) are common knowledge before contracting takes place. For now
we consider the case of non-negative inuence parameters; in Section 3.3 we extend the
model to allow for "ij < 0.
It is automatic that each agent i will be paid zero in the case of failure. The
principal wishes to solve for the optimal wage wi  0 to pay agent i in the case of
success. The timing of the model is such that the principal chooses the wages wi for
9every agent i. The wage wi of agent i is then common knowledge to all agents. Then,
given the wages, each agent i chooses his eort level pi to maximize his expected utility,
given by his wage minus his cost of eort, i.e.:
wi1r=1   ci (p): (3)
Agents choose their levels of eort simultaneously, and their eort levels constitute a
Nash Equilibrium.
The solution of the model is then given as follows. The principal maximizes her











subject to the incentive compatibility (IC) conditions for each agent i:
pi 2 argmax









Before we move to analyze specic cases of the model, a couple of points about the
setup are worth making. First, as specied above, agent i sets his eort pi without
observing the eort levels of other agents (but rather only correctly expecting them in
equilibrium). Since the cost of agent i's eort depends on the eort levels exerted by
other agents, this implies that agent i decides on his own eort without observing the
implied cost (only correctly expecting it in equilibrium). We think this is a realistic
feature of the model. For example, a CEO may commit to a business trip and exert
eort in advance to make it successful, but the exact cost she bears in making the trip
will depend on the level of preparation conducted by her secretary, which is not known
to the CEO until after the trip is completed. Alternatively, the cost function ci may
combine elements of private benet { e.g., the extent to which the CEO enjoys her trip
{ which again depend on the eort by other agents in the rm.
Second, since the agent is paid zero upon failure (which is a consequence of the
combination of risk neutrality, limited liability, and zero reservation utility), an increase
in wi corresponds to an increase in both incentives (the sensitivity of pay) and expected
pay (the level of pay, which is often referred to as the \wage" in empirical studies).
Thus, in the analysis that follows, all results pertaining to wi are predictions for both
the level and sensitivity of pay. Both move in the same direction: an increase (decrease)
10in wi raises (reduces) both. These predictions do not hinge upon our assumption of
risk neutrality but will continue to hold in a model with risk aversion and a binding
participation constraint. An increase in the sensitivity of pay will cause the agent to
demand a risk premium, augmenting the level of pay.
3 Substitute Eort
This section specializes the general production function (1) to the case in which the
agents' eorts are perfect substitutes, i.e. the probability of success depends on the
aggregate eort undertaken by all agents. Section 3.1 considers a preliminary two-agent
model, as this version of the model is most tractable and illustrates the core ideas most
clearly. Section 3.2 considers a three-agent model which is the core focus of the paper.
3.1 The Preliminary Two-Agent Model
The production function (1) now specializes to:











Dierentiating agent i's expected utility function (5) gives his rst-order condition
as:
wi = pi(1   "jipj).










(1   (p1 + p2) + p1p2("12 + "21)). (7)
We dene the following term:
Denition 1 Synergy is dened to be the sum of the inuence parameters s = "12 +
"21.
11We also make the following assumption to resolve cases in which the principal is
indierent between two contracts:
Assumption 1 When computing the optimal contract, if the principal is indierent
between two arrangements A and B, and A is preferred by all agents over B, then A is
chosen.
The solution to the model and its properties are given by Proposition 1 below.
Proposition 1 (Substitute production function, two agents.) (i) For all nonzero syn-
ergy, optimal eorts are equal: p
1(s) = p
2(s)  p(s). There exists a critical synergy









3s s 2 (0;s)
1 s  s:
Optimal eort p(s) is strictly increasing on (0;s] and explodes to 1 at s. When there
is no synergy, any combination of eorts that sum to 1
2 is optimal.
(ii) Total wages given success, w
1 +w









2) are both increasing in s on (0;s].
(iii) Suppose synergy is subcritical. An increase in either inuence parameter will
lead to increases in optimal eort, total wages given success, and expected total wages.
(iv) Suppose synergy is subcritical. The more inuential agent receives the higher
wages upon success, i.e. w
1 > w
2 if and only if "12 > "21.
(v) Fix a subcritical synergy level. An increase in agent i's relative inuence (i.e.

















i all strictly increase.




j depends on "ji as follows: An increase in "ij leads to an increase in w
j if
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j is always positive.
(vii) The more inuential agent receives the higher utility.
We now discuss the intuition behind and implications of each part of the Proposi-
tion. Part (i) states that each agent exerts the same eort level. This result may appear
surprising as it seems ecient for the more inuential agent to exert the greater eort
level. It is tempting to consider inuence as a component of an agent's \productivity",
and conclude that the more inuential agent is more \productive" and so should work
harder. However, this is not the case, because greater eort by the more inuential
agent decreases the cost of eort of his colleague, inducing the latter to exert more
eort. Mathematically, from the principal's reduced-form objective function (7), we
can see that the cost saving due to synergy is given by p1p2 ("12 + "21). It thus depends
on the product p1p2 and is highest when p1 = p2. Assume without loss of generality
that agent i is the more inuential agent. If pi > pj, then the principal is not beneting
much from agent i's inuence on agent j since agent j is exerting little eort; thus, it
is optimal for her to increase pj. If pi < pj, then the principal should increase pi to
allow agent j (who is exerting high eort) to benet from agent i's inuence. In sum,
for the principal to gain from the synergy, she needs pi to be high to reduce j's cost of
eort, and pj also to be high so that j benets from this reduced cost of eort.
The expression for the cost saving also shows that it is only the sum of inuence
parameters { i.e., the synergy s { that matters for the determination of equilibrium
eort levels p(s). The components "12 and "21 themselves do not matter beyond their
sum. To glean the intuition, the synergy can be thought of as an \echo" between the
two agents { the inuence of agent i on agent j raises the optimal eort level for agent
i, which reduces the cost of eort for agent j, which raises the optimal eort level for
agent j, which, due to the inuence of agent j on agent i, reduces the cost of eort for
agent i, which raises the optimal eort level for agent i, and so on. In this process, it is
the combination of inuence parameters (here, their sum) that determines the optimal
eorts of the two agents and, in the current specication, pulls them closer to each
other.
Intuitively, we see that as the synergy parameter s increases, eort by each agent is
more productive { in addition to its (unchanged) direct eect on rm output, it now has
a greater eect on the other agent's cost function, and so it is ecient for the principal
to implement a higher eort level. When the synergy crosses a threshold s, the optimal
eort level jumps discontinuously to its maximum value of 1. Essentially, when s < s,
the echo between the two agents is dampening and the solution is interior. When
13s > s, the synergy is so strong that the echo is amplifying and the model \explodes",
leading to the maximum eort being optimal.
Part (ii) states that wages increase with synergy. While intuitive, this result is far
from automatic. With greater synergies, it is ecient to implement a higher eort
level, which requires a higher wage holding all else equal. However, it seems that there
is a counteracting eect in the opposite direction { when synergies are higher, each
agent's cost of eort is lower, and so a lower wage is required to implement a given
eort level. Indeed, in a single-agent moral hazard model under risk neutrality and
limited liability, the optimal contract involves paying the agent one-half of the rm's
output, regardless of the agent's productivity or cost of eort, because these two eects
exactly oset each other.
Here, wages are unambiguously increasing in the synergy parameter s. The key is
that synergies have no direct eect on output. The synergy parameter does not appear
in the production function and so does not aect the direct marginal productivity of an
agent's eort. It only aects output indirectly through changing the other agent's cost
of eort and in turn aecting his eort choice. In a Nash equilibrium, when choosing
his eort level, agent i takes agent j's eort choice as given and does not take into
account the eect he has on agent j's cost function. Thus, he does not internalize
his externality, and so the principal chooses to give him a sharper contract to cause
him to do so. Importantly, this result illustrates the dierence between our approach
of modeling the complementarity between the agents in the cost function (or private
benet function), and an alternative approach of modeling it in the production function.
Under the alternative approach, wages would be independent of the complementarity.
We will return to this point in Section 3.4.
Part (ii) implies that total wages, as a fraction of output, will be higher in rms
in which synergies are greater. Moreover, these higher wages come in the form of
performance-sensitive pay. This is a potential explanation for why high equity incen-
tives are given to low-level employees, even though they may have a small direct eect
on output. High equity incentives are optimal if they have a large indirect eect by
changing another agent's cost function { for example, an ecient analyst in a private
equity rm reduces the cost of a director going to a meeting by producing accurate
brieng materials. Synergies are likely particularly high in small and young rms, where
job descriptions are often blurred and interactions are frequent. This may explain why
incentive-based compensation is particularly high in start-ups, even among low-level
employees { as was the case in rms such as Google. Hochberg and Lindsey (2010)
14document systematic evidence of broad-based option plans. Note that our model can
only explain equity compensation to rank-and-le employees that exert signicant syn-
ergies on a suciently large number of people. If rms grant equity to non-synergistic
employees, this is likely for alternative reasons already in the literature.1
Part (iii) follows naturally from parts (i) and (ii). Since an increase in a single
inuence parameter, holding the other inuence parameter constant, raises the total
synergy level s, it will raise the eort levels of both agents, total wages, and expected
total wages. However, a single inuence parameter has no independent eect on eort
and total wages other than through its impact on the total synergy. Total synergy is
a \sucient statistic" for eort and total wages { how the synergy is divided between
the two inuence parameters does not matter. The inuence parameters do have an in-
dependent eect on the relative pay of each employee, as shown in part (iv). The more
inuential agent receives the higher wage. This result holds even though both agents
exert the same level of eort, so the higher wage is not merely a \compensating dier-
ential" for the disutility of exerting a higher level of eort. It also holds even though the
agents have the same direct productivity in the production function (6): each agent's
task is equally important to rm value. Instead, the wage dierential is driven purely
by the indirect eect each agent has on his colleague. Part (iv) leads to empirical
predictions for within-rm dierences in pay: more inuential agents should receive
higher wages, even if all the tasks they perform are the same. For example, senior
faculty within academic departments are paid more than junior faculty even though
they all have the same formal job description (teaching courses and writing papers);
the former can reduce the latter's cost of eort through mentorship and guidance.
Part (v) analyzes the eect of an increase in agent i's relative inuence: it increases
agent i's wage both in absolute terms and also relative to agent j's wage. Since agent i is
exerting a greater externality, it is ecient to pay him more to cause him to internalize
this externality.
While part (iii) shows that an increase in i's inuence parameter augments total
wages, part (vi) studies the eect on the individual wages of each agent. It is clear
that agent i's wage rises, since total wages rise (part (iii)) and i's share of total wages
1Oyer (2004) justies broad-based option plans from a retention perspective: options are worth
more when employees' outside options are higher, persuading them to remain within the rm. Oyer
and Schaefer (2005) nd support for both this explanation and the idea that option compensation
screens for employees with desirable characteristics. They do not test our synergy explanation, which
has not been previously proposed to our knowledge. Bergman and Jenter (2007) present theory and
evidence that option plans are used to take advantage of employees' irrational overvaluation of their
rm's options.
15rises due to his greater relative inuence (part (v)). However, there are two conicting
eects on agent j's absolute wage: total wages rise, but j's share of total wages falls.
Part (vi) characterizes which force dominates when. If the principal held w
j constant,
the rise in "ij would increase agent j's eort because it reduces his marginal cost of
eort. However, the principal need not hold w
j constant. She could choose to decrease
j's wage and thus extract part of the \surplus" created by the rise in "ij by paying j
less; in return she accepts a smaller (but still positive) increase in agent j's eort. Put
dierently, since j's marginal cost of eort has fallen, it is cheaper to induce eort from
him and she takes advantage of this by lowering his wage. Alternatively, she could
increase j's wage and reinforce the increase in j's eort brought about by the rise in
"ij. Put dierently, since it is cheaper to induce eort from j, she can take advantage
of this by increasing j's eort even further (above and beyond the increase already
occurring from the rise in "ij) via a higher wage. The latter option is desirable if j's
eort is particularly benecial to the team, i.e., if j's inuence on i is particularly high.
Moreover, the threshold level of "ji, 1
6p(s), is decreasing in the common eort level
and thus the common synergy { i.e., the higher the synergy, the greater the range
of parameters "ji under which agent j's wage increases. As explained earlier, the
synergy creates an \echo" between the agents which amplies the eect of changes in
a parameter on the equilibrium. If the echo is strong enough, the increase in "ij causes
such a large increase in total wages that it outweighs the fall in j's share of the total
wage pool. Thus, j's wage rises in absolute terms. While the change in j's absolute
wage depends on "ji, the expected wage pw
j unambiguously rises (regardless of "ji),
due to the increase in the optimal eort level p from part (iii).
Finally, part (vii) compares the utility of the two agents. The more inuential agent
receives a higher wage, but also has a higher cost function since he is helped out less by
his colleague. The Proposition shows that the rst eect is stronger, and so the more
inuential agent receives the higher utility.
3.2 The Main Three-Agent Model
We now present the three-agent model which is the core analysis of this section. The
production function (1) now specializes to:
Pr(r = 1) =
p1 + p2 + p3
3
: (9)
























3 2 arg max
p1;p2;p32[0;1]
(p1 + p2 + p3)
3
(1   (p1 + p2 + p3) + Ap1p2 + Bp1p3 + Cp2p3);
where
A = "12 + "21 B = "13 + "31 C = "23 + "32:
We dene the following terms:
Denition 2 The synergy prole s is dened to be the vector (A;B;C). The quan-
tities A, B and C are the synergy components of the synergy prole. The size of
s is dened to be s = jj(A;B;C)jj.
Quantity A is the analog of the synergy scalar s in the two-agent model: it measures
the sum of the inuence that agents 1 and 2 exert on each other, and B and C are
dened analogously for agents 1 and 3 and agents 2 and 3, respectively. In a three-
agent model, there are three relevant synergy components between each of the three
pairs of agents, which together form the synergy prole s.
The solution to the model is given by Proposition 2 below for the case of an interior
solution, and Proposition 3 for the case of a boundary solution.
Proposition 2 (Substitute production function, three agents, interior solution.) (i)
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B + C   A
A + B   C
: (11)
In particular, interior optimal eort proles occur only when each synergy component
is strictly smaller than the sum of the other two. Moreover, the optimal eort ratios are
homogenous of degree 0 in A;B and C. Therefore the direction of the synergy prole is
sucient to determine the direction of the optimal eort prole provided it is interior.
(ii) Fix a direction of the synergy prole such that each component is strictly smaller
than the sum of the other two. There exists a critical synergy size threshold s such
that, if s is subcritical then the optimal eort prole is interior, and the size of the
optimal eort prole is a strictly increasing function of synergy size.2 At the critical
synergy size s, the optimal eort prole explodes so that at least one agent is now
applying eort 1.
(iii) Total wages given success and expected total wages are strictly increasing in s
up to the critical synergy size s.
(iv) Fix a synergy prole such that the optimal eort prole is interior. An increase
in agent i's relative inuence (i.e., increasing at least one element of f"ijgj6=i and
decreasing some elements of f"jigj6=i so that s is unchanged) increases both his relative
















weakly increases for all j and strictly increases at least one j.
Proposition 3 (Substitute production function, three agents, boundary solution.) Sup-
pose there is a single synergy component that is greater than the sum of the other two.
Then the eorts exerted by the two agents who have the largest synergy with each other
are equal and the other agent does not exert eort. The size of the other two synergy
components has no eect on the optimal eort prole and the model is isomorphic to
the 2-agent model.
Combining the results of Propositions 2 and 3 gives the full solution to the model
as Theorem 2, the key result of this section:
2Recall that part (i) implies that, in this interval, the direction of the optimal eort prole is xed.
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Figure 1: The A + B + C = K simplex where K > 0 is some constant.
Theorem 2 The optimal eort prole is summarized in Figure 1.
Corollary 1 Suppose the inuence between any pair of agents is symmetric. That is
for each i 6= j, "ij = "ji. Then when the optimal eort prole is in the interior, the
ratios of optimal wages coincide with the ratios of optimal eorts.
We now discuss the intuition behind and implications of each of the above results.
Part (i) of Proposition 2 states that the ratio of the optimal eort levels only depends
on the relative size of the dierent synergy components A, B and C, and not their
absolute magnitude. Thus, a proportional increase in each synergy component will
augment each eort level to the same degree, leaving the ratios unchanged.
Part (ii) states that, if the size of the synergy prole s is suciently small, and the
synergy components are balanced so that no single component exceeds the sum of the
other two, the optimal eort prole is strictly interior. Analogous to part (i) of Propo-
sition 1, when synergy size increases, eort by each agent becomes more productive as
19it now has a greater impact on the other agents' cost functions, and so it is ecient for
the principal to implement a higher eort prole. When synergies become suciently
strong, it becomes optimal for the principal to implement the maximum eort level of
1 for at least one agent.
The simplex in Figure 1 xes the sum of the synergy components A + B + C
at a constant K and studies the eect of changing the relative level of the synergy
components. The middle triangle (bounded by the three dots) in Figure 1 illustrates
the case of an interior eort prole summarized by Proposition 2. For an interior eort
prole, all three synergy components matter for the relative size of the individual eort
levels. For example, if and only if B > C (i.e. the left-hand side of the triangle), we
have p1 > p2: since agent 1 generates more synergies with agent 3 than does agent 2,
it is ecient for agent 1 to exert a higher eort level than the level of eort exerted by
agent 2; from Corollary 1, if pairwise inuences are symmetric, agent 1 will also enjoy
higher pay.
Note that it is the total synergy between agent 1 and agent 3 (relative to the total
synergy between agent 2 and agent 3) that determines the relative values of p1 and p2,
not agent 1's unidirectional inuence on agent 3, "13 (relative to agent 2's unidirectional
inuence on agent 3, "23). It may seem that p1 should only depend on "13 (and not
"31) as only the former aects the productivity of agent 1's eort. However, when "31
rises, agent 1's cost function is lower and so it is cheaper to implement a higher level
of eort. The intuition is similar to that in the two-agent model, whereby synergy
can be thought of as an echo between two agents, and it is the combination of their
inuences on each other that matters, not each inuence parameter separately. Hence,
when the synergistic relation between agents 1 and 3 is stronger than that between
agents 2 and 3, it is optimal for agent 1 to exert higher eort than agent 2. Similarly,
if and only if A > C, then p1 > p3, and if and only if A > B, then p2 > p3. In sum, the
relative size of the total synergies between each of the three pairs of agents determines
their relative eort levels. The agent that exhibits the greatest total synergies with
both of his colleagues will work the hardest (and earn the highest pay, if inuence is
symmetric).
On the one hand, this result extends the principle in the two-agent case, that the
optimal eort level depends on the common synergy, and not the individual inuence
parameters. The synergy prole is a \sucient statistic" for the eort prole; how
it is divided into the individual inuence parameters does not matter. On the other
hand, the result also contrasts the two-agent setting, since it is no longer the case that
20all agents exert the same eort level. In the two-agent case, there is only one synergy
component (agent 1's synergy component with agent 2 is identical to agent 2's synergy
component with agent 1) and so one common eort level. Here, the existence of three
synergy components allows for asymmetry in eort levels between the three agents.
However, while there are individual eort levels, they still only depend on the common
synergy components, not the individual inuence parameters.
A natural application of the model is the case where one agent has strong synergies
with both other agents, but the other agents do not have strong synergies between them.
Suppose, for example, that A and B are large, but C is close to zero. The synergistic
agent, agent 1, is the CEO, who shares synergies with two division managers, agents 2
and 3, but they do not share strong synergies between them. As we can see in Figure
1, in this case, the eort exerted by agent 1 will be highest. Essentially, agents 2 and
3 can be aggregated, and their combined eort level is close to the eort exerted by
agent 1.
Proposition 3 considers the case of a boundary eort prole. It states that, if one
synergy component exceeds the sum of the other two, then the model collapses to the
two-agent model of Proposition 1. Intuitively, if the synergy between two agents is
suciently strong, then only those two agents matter for the principal { she ignores
the third agent and induces zero eort from him. This \corner" result (captured by the
three triangles that surround the middle triangle in Figure 1) is striking because the
third agent still has the same direct eect on the production function (9) as the other
two agents, yet is being completely ignored. Moreover, it means that even if there is
no change to the synergies exerted by the third agent on his colleagues, an increase in
the synergies between agents 1 and 2 can lead to him being excluded. Thus, the third
agent's participation depends not only on his own synergy parameters, but also on
parameters that have no direct relevance to him. Since the synergies between agents 1
and 2 are so strong, it is always more ecient to increase their eort level from p   "
to p rather than to increase the third agent's eort level from 0 from ". Note that this
result holds even though we have a convex function and so it is more costly to increase
the eort levels of agents 1 and 2 than agent 3. The convex cost function is why, even
if A > B and A > C, agent 3 typically exerts a strictly positive eort level even though
he exhibits fewer synergies. Only if A > B +C are the synergies between the rst two
agents suciently strong to outweigh the eect of the convex cost function and lead to
agent 3's eort level being zero. Due to the strong synergy, raising the eort levels of
agents 1 and 2 \echoes" many times and is thus more eective than raising the eort
21level of agent 3. Another way to view the intuition is that increased synergy between
agents 1 and 2 raises the value of the rm, and thus the cost to the principal of giving
agent 3 equity to induce eort from him.
The above result has interesting implications for the optimal composition of a team.
If two agents exhibit suciently high synergies with each other, there is no benet in
adding a third agent to the team, even if the third agent has just as high a direct
impact on rm value as the existing two agents and has strictly positive synergies with
the rst two agents. If the third agent was added, he would become a redundant \third
wheel" and be asked to implement zero eort, so there is no loss in excluding him from
the team. Moreover, the three agents can be interpreted as three dierent divisions
of a rm, in which case Proposition 3 has implications for the boundaries of the rm.
If two divisions exhibit suciently strong synergies with each other (e.g. there are
spillovers in marketing campaigns), it may be optimal to divest a third division even
if that third division makes a strong direct contribution to overall rm value and the
rst two divisions exhibit no direct synergies in the production function. Conversely,
it may be optimal for a two-division rm not to acquire a third division even if it
would generate strictly positive synergies, if those synergies are low relative to those
enjoyed by the two existing divisions. Conventional wisdom is that any division that
enjoys positive synergies should be included within a rm. Here, even though the third
division enjoys strictly positive synergies with the rst two, it is relative, not absolute,
synergies that determine the optimal boundaries of the rm. The empirical implication
is that a decision to divest (or not acquire) a division might not be driven by the low
synergies generated (or potentially generated) by this division, but rather by the strong
synergies between other divisions.
While in Proposition 2, all three synergy components matter for the optimal eort
prole, in Proposition 3 only the largest synergy component matters and the other two
are irrelevant. For example, within the middle triangle, the relative size of B and C
aects the relative size of p1 and p2, as discussed earlier. In the top triangle (where
A > B+C), we have p1 = p2 regardless of the relative size of B and C. Intuitively, the
synergy between agents 1 and 2 is so important that their individual synergies with
agent 3 become irrelevant. Wages are then determined as in the two-agent model and
depend on the relative inuence of each agent.
Having considered the optimal eort prole, we now turn to the implications for
the optimal wage prole. Part (iii) of Proposition 2 is analogous to part (ii) of Proposi-
tion 1: total wages depend on the total synergy across all agents. While total synergy
22determines total wages, the inuence parameters determine relative wages: part (iv)
of Proposition 2 is analogous to part (iv) of Proposition 1. An increase in one agent's
inuence parameter augments his wage in both absolute and relative terms; the intu-
ition is as earlier. Moreover, if the inuence parameters are symmetric across all pairs
of agents, the entire wage prole can be fully solved: Corollary 1 states that the ratios
of optimal wages coincides with the ratios of optimal eort.
The model can thus explain why CEOs earn signicantly more than other senior
managers. Bebchuk, Cremers, and Peyer (2011) argue that this is due to inecient rent
extraction by the CEO, but our theory suggests that it may be ecient: the centrality
of the CEO leads to him exhibiting greatest synergies, increasing his optimal eort level
and thus pay.3 Thus, the three-agent model shows that a CEO's wage depends on the
scope of the rm under his control, i.e. the number of agents (or divisions) with which
he exhibits synergies and the strength of these synergies. Talent assignment models
argue that CEO pay depends on the size of the rm under his control (e.g. Gabaix and
Landier (2008), Tervi o (2008)), where rm size is typically measured by an accounting
variable such as total assets or prots. Our theory suggests that the relevant measure
of rm size is the scope and depth of the CEO's synergies. Thus, the CEO of a large
rm in which the divisions operate independently (e.g. a holding company) may be
paid less highly than the manager of a small rm where there are strong synergies (e.g.
a start-up).
3.3 Negative Inuence Parameters
This subsection extends the model to the case where the inuence parameters "ij can
be negative. We start with the two-agent model and then move to the three-agent
model.
3.3.1 The Preliminary Two-Agent Model









(1   (p1 + p2) + p1p2("12 + "21)).
There are thus two cases to consider.
3Kale, Reis, and Venkateswaran (2009) study another reason for why high pay for the CEO may
be ecient { to provide tournament incentives for other senior managers. They nd that the pay
dierential between the CEO and other senior managers is positively related to rm performance.
23Case 1. "12 > 0 > "21, and "12 + "21 > 0.
By inspecting the maximization problem, we can see that the solution only depends
on the total synergy s and not the individual inuence parameters "ij. Since we have
s > 0, we are in the case of the core model and so Proposition 1 holds.
Case 2. "12 + "21 < 0.
Since we now have s < 0, by inspecting the maximization problem we can see that
the solution requires p
1p
2 = 0 and so one agent exerts zero eort. Since both agents
have the same direct productivity, it does not matter which agent this is. Without loss
of generality, assume that p








This is a single-agent model. The solution is standard, and is given by Proposition 4
below:
Proposition 4 (Substitute production function, two agents, negative synergy.) Sup-
pose that the total synergy s is negative. Then only one agent exerts strictly positive
eort; without loss of generality, assume this is agent 1. The analog of Proposition 1
is as follows:




(ii) The wage levels are given by w
1 = 1
2 and w
2 = 0, and are independent of s as
long as s < 0.
(iii) An increase in either inuence parameter has no eect on eort and wages as
long as s < 0.
(iv) Since the principal is indierent over which agent has the zero eort and wage
level, it is possible to have w1 > w2 for "12 < "21.
(v) For a xed s < 0, changes in agent i's relative inuence have no eect.
(vi) As long as s < 0, changes in agent i's absolute inuence have no eect.
(vii) The agent who is exerting eort has the higher utility. Since the principal is
indierent over which agent has the zero eort and wage level, it is possible that this
is the less inuential agent.
We can summarize the above results as follows. Case 1 shows that, as long as
the total synergy is positive, the core model's result of equal eort levels (irrespective
of individual inuence parameters) continues to hold in the case where one inuence
parameter is negative. It may seem surprising that the principal chooses to hire (i.e.,
induce strictly positive eort from) an agent that exert negative inuence, but this is
24optimal if it is outweighed by the other agent exerting a suciently positive inuence
so that the total synergy is positive. Case 2 shows that, if total synergy is negative,
the principal only wishes to hire one agent, and the individual inuence parameters
are irrelevant for the choice of agent. Again, it is the total synergy that matters for
whether both agents exert eort, so it does not matter if one inuence parameter is
negative as long as the total synergy is positive.
3.3.2 The Main Three-Agent Model
In the two-agent model, the solution depended on whether the total synergy (rather
than the individual inuence parameters) was positive or negative. In the three-agent
model, the solution depends on whether the synergy components are positive or nega-
tive. Without loss of generality, we will assume that A is the largest synergy component,
followed by B and then C. There are four cases to consider:
Case 1. A > B > C > 0.
If each synergy component is positive, we are in the case of the core model and Propo-
sitions 2 and 3 continue to hold.
Case 2. A > B > 0 > C.
Here, one of the synergy components is negative. This ensures that there is a single
synergy component that is greater than the sum of the other two: A > B+C. We thus
obtain the corner solution of Proposition 3. Only the two agents who have the largest
synergy with each other exert eort, and the problem reduces to the 2 agent model.
Case 3. A > 0 > B > C
This case is similar to Case 2 in that we have A > B + C. We thus obtain the corner
solution of Proposition 3.
Case 4. 0 > A > B > C.
In this case, only one agent exerts eort. Since all three agents have the same direct
productivity, it does not matter which agent this is. Without loss of generality, assume
that p
2 = p
3 = 0. We are in a single agent model where p
1 = 1
2 and the analogy of
Proposition 4 applies.
3.4 Discussion: The Synergy Concept
A key feature of our model is that an agent's eort reduces the marginal cost of eort
of his colleague. Alternatively, as mentioned before, this can be interpreted as an
agent's eort increasing the marginal private benet that the colleague derives from
25his own eort. This feature generates the synergies among agents in our model. To
what extent is this dierent from instead assuming that there are complementarities in
the production function, i.e., that an agent's eort increases the marginal productivity
of the other agent's eort in the production function?
In a single-agent model with separable utility, changing the agent's marginal pro-
ductivity by multiplying the production function by a constant factor is indeed isomor-
phic to changing his marginal cost by dividing the cost function by the same multiple.
However, in a multi-agent world, synergies in the cost function are fundamentally
dierent from complementarities in the production function. The most conceptually
important dierence is that cost synergies are a true externality, but production com-
plementarities are not. To illustrate this distinction, suppose that agents do not aect
other agents' cost of eort, i.e., ci = hi (pi) (= 1
4p2
i in the two-agent model), but
that the production function exhibits complementarities, e.g., in the two-agent model
Pr(r = 1) =
p1+p2
2 +s0p




p1p2. An increase in agent i's eort will increase the productivity of agent j, but
does not take this into account because he holds agent j's eort xed when calculating
his own optimal action. One might be tempted to conclude that the complementarity
therefore represents an externality. To show that it does not, consider the case of a
single agent who internalizes everything { he owns production and exerts both eorts
p1 and p2. If the complementarity captured by the positive cross partial s is an ex-
ternality, it should be taken into account by the single agent since he internalizes all





















and analogously for the choice of pj. Thus, even in a single-agent model, the com-
plementarity between pi and pj is ignored. Even the single agent holds pj xed when
choosing pi, which is why pj enters as p
j in the above objective function rather than as
a function of pi. Thus, the optimal pi is independent of the cross-partial with respect
to pi and pj. To the extent that rst-order conditions are sucient, then, by denition,
second-order eects such as production complementarities do not matter.
To illustrate further that the multi- and single-agent models are similar under pro-
duction complementarities, and thus that such complementarities are not true exter-
nalities, consider the case in which there are no cost synergies (but there may be
production complementarities), there is unlimited liability, and utility is quasi-linear
in money. Then, the optimality conditions of the aggregate agent in a single-agent
26model equal the aggregate of the optimality conditions of each individual agent in a
multi-agent model. Thus, if the optimal contract for the single agent is w(r), then the
optimal contracts in the two-agent world are simply two copies of w(r) plus some lump-
sum transfers. This is essentially a consequence of the the analysis of the free-rider
problem in Holmstrom (1982). This will not be the case if there are cost synergies.
More generally, because contracts are contingent upon output but cannot be made
contingent on eort costs, agents naturally internalize the eects of their eorts on
production but not on costs. To illustrate, in a multi-agent model with production

















In the current model, with cost synergies only, an aggregate agent's optimization
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Equation (12) shows that agent i does internalize the production complementarity
s when choosing his eort level. This is because the complementarity s aects output,
and he receives a share of output since output is contractible. By contrast, equation
(14) shows that agent i does not consider his inuence on agent j, "ij, when considering
his eort level: this term does not appear in his objective function. This is because
his inuence aects agent j's cost of eort (which is non-contractible, and so he does
not share in this eect) but has no eect on output, and so he does not internalize it.
Thus, synergies in the cost function represent true externalities that are not internalized
by the agents. Even with unlimited liability and quasilinear utility, the optimality
conditions of the aggregate agent in the single-agent model do not equal the aggregate
of the optimality conditions of each individual agent in a multi-agent model. In the
multi-agent model, the principal would like the agents to internalize the cost synergies
as they aect total surplus, as shown by equation (13), and thus varies the contract to
cause them to do so. Indeed, the paper's main objective is to analyze how the principal
increases incentives to induce the agents to internalize their cost externalities, although
27such internalization is only partial since it is costly to the principal { due to limited
liability, increased incentives can only be achieved by an increase in the success payo
and not a reduction in the failure payo, and the principal trades o this cost with the
benets of internalization.
Note that, even though cost and production synergies are fundamentally dierent
from a modeling standpoint, in that the latter but not the former are internalized by
an agent, they are similar in the economic idea that they represent. In the presence
of production synergies, eort by one agent increases the marginal productivity of
his colleague, for a given unit cost. In the presence of cost synergies, eort by one
agent reduces the marginal cost of his colleague, for a given unit productivity. Thus,
although we are modeling synergies dierently from a framework in which they appear
in the production function, our model continues to capture the same economic idea
that synergies improve a colleague's productivity-to-cost ratio.
In the next section, we analyze our model of cost synergies in addition to com-
plementarities in the production function, and show that the presence of complemen-
tarities in the production function over and above cost synergies does not change the
implications generated by cost synergies so far in the paper.
4 Complementary Eort
This section specializes the general production function (1) to the case in which the
agents' eorts are perfect complements, i.e. the probability of success depends on
the minimum eort level undertaken by all agents. The production function (1) now
specializes to:
Pr(r = 1) = min(p1;p2;:::;pN): (15)







Dierentiating agent i's utility function (3) gives his rst-order conditions as:










28These rst-order conditions already give us some preliminary results. Equation (16)
shows that all agents will exert the same eort level, as is intuitive given the perfect
complementarities production function (15). Equation (17) shows that agent i's wage
is linear in his cost parameter i, i.e. agents with more dicult tasks (higher i) will
receive higher wages.
Plugging the rst-order conditions (16) and (17) into the principal's objective func-

























We dene the following terms:









Diculty is dened to be the sum of the cost parameters,  
P
i i.
Assumption 3 Diculty  > 1
2.
This is a nontriviality assumption about the diculty of the project being not too
low. It ensures that the problem has nontrivial solutions in agent eorts for at least
some realized levels of synergy.
The solution to the model is given by Proposition 5 below.
Proposition 5 (Complementary production function.) (i) There exists a unique crit-









3s s 2 [0;s ())
1 s  s ():
Optimal eort p(s) is strictly increasing on [0;s ()]. Furthermore, if diculty  > 1,
then p(s) explodes to 1 when the critical synergy level s () is reached.
(ii) Total wages given success, w(s) =
P
i w
i(s), and expected total wages p(s)w(s)
are both strictly increasing on [0;s ()].
29(iii) Suppose synergy is subcritical. An increase in any inuence parameter of any
agent will lead to increases in optimal eort, total payment given success and total
expected success payment.
(iv) Fix a subcritical synergy level. Suppose agent i's relative inuence increases,
i.e. his total inuence increases while holding synergy constant. If the resulting decrease
in the total inuence of the other agents is nondistortionary4 then there is an increase
















weakly increases for all j and strictly increases at least one j.
Proposition 5 shows that our model's key results are robust to the nature of the
production function. Even though the perfect complements production function of this
section is the polar opposite of the perfect substitutes production function of Section 3,
the main insights regarding the eort and wage proles remain unchanged. In addition
to demonstrating robustness to the specication of the production function, this section
also shows that the results naturally extend to the case of N agents.
As in Section 3, an increase in total synergy leads to an increase in the implemented
eort levels, total pay and expected total pay; the intuition is the same. An increase
in a single agent's inuence parameters augments total synergy (thus leading to the
above eects) and his own pay in both relative and absolute terms.
5 Conclusion
This paper has studied the eect of synergies on optimal eort levels and wages in
a team-based setting. We model synergies as eort by one agent reducing the cost,
or increasing the private benet, of eort by a colleague. This is a fundamentally
dierent notion of synergy to complementarities in the production function and leads
to a number of new results. In a two-agent framework, eort levels are equal even
though inuence may be asymmetric. Wages dier across agents, even though both
agents exert the same eort level and have the same direct impact on output, with the
4In other words, the decrease in the other agents' total inuence is achieved by simply multiplying
their inuence parameters with a common scalar c < 1.
30more inuential agent receiving higher pay. Total wages increase with the total level
of synergy, consistent with the high equity incentives in small start-up rms. In short,
total synergy determines total eort and total wages; individual inuence parameters
only aect individual wages. The model also shows that it may be optimal to grant
rank-and-le employees strong equity incentives, even if their direct eect on output
is low, if they exert suciently high synergies. This prediction is consistent with the
frequency of broad-based stock option plans.
With three agents, optimal eort levels dier and depend on the total synergies an
agent enjoys with his colleagues rather than his unidirectional inuence. If synergies
between two agents are suciently strong, it is optimal for the principal to focus
entirely on these agents and ignore the third. This result has implications for the
optimal composition of a team and optimal rm boundaries { if synergies between two
agents (divisions) become suciently strong, it is ecient to discard the third agent
(division) even if his (its) own parameters do not change. Agents that exert synergies
over a greater number of colleagues receive higher pay, consistent with the wage premia
CEOs enjoy over divisional managers.
31A Proofs
We rst start with a maximization problem which we will make repeated use of in these
proofs. Consider the following maximization problem where a;b  0:
max
x2[0;1]
x(1   bx + ax
2):
Let x(a;b) denote the set of argument solutions.
Lemma 1 (i) If b  1
2, then x(a;b) = 1.
(ii) If b > 1
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3a ;1g a = a(b)
1 a > a(b)
:





First let b  1
2. If a = 0, it is clear that x(0;b) = 1. If a > 0, then
d
dx
U(x;a;b)jx=1 = 1   2bx + 3ax
2jx=1 = 1   2b + 3a > 0 (18)
To show x(a;b) = 1, it suces to show there is no local maximum of U(x;a;b) on
(0;1). By the quadratic formula, a local maximum exists (anywhere) if and only if
b2   3a = 3a(b  b
3a   1) > 0. Since b  1
2, this implies b
3a > 2. In addition, b
3a is the
inection point of U(x;a;b). Since U(x;a;b) is a positive cubic, the inection point lies
above the local maximum. Thus, since d
dxU(x;a;b) > 0 for x = 1 (from (18)), and the
inection point is not reached until x = b
3a > 2, the local maximum must be between
x = 1 and x = b
3a. Thus, we must also have d
dxU(x;a;b) > 0 for all x < 1. Thus, there
is no local maximum of U(x;a;b) on (0;1).
Now consider b > 1
2. We have the following facts:
Fact 1: xloc(a;b) is strictly increasing in a on [0; b2
3 ]. This follows from the fact that
b  
p
b2   3a is convex while 3a is linear and both are equal to zero when a = 0.













< 1 when x
loc(a;b) < 1




Fact 4: For all suciently low a, x(a;b) = xloc(a;b). To see this, notice since
lima#0 xloc(a;b) = 1
2b < 1, so for all suciently low a, the local maximum is in the
interval (0;1). Of course when a = 0, the local maximum is the global maximum. By
continuity, the fact is true.
Clearly, whenever xloc(a;b) > 1 or does not exist, then x(a;b) = 1. Therefore,
suppose xloc(a;b)  1 and exists. Fact 1 implies that the set of a that satisfy these two
conditions is of the form [0;~ a] where ~ a  b2




and U(1;a;b) satisfy the single crossing property on the interval [0;~ a]. ~ a is the upper
bound on the interval of a's such that xloc(a;b)  1 and exists. Thus, there are two





and U(1;a;b) cross at a = ~ a. Second, we could have xloc(~ a;b) < 1.
Note that at a = ~ a, the function U (x;a;b) must have a single critical point. If it had
two critical points, we could increase a. An increase in a \attens" out the cubic by
bringing the value of the local minimum and local maximum closer, but since there are
two critical points to begin with, this can be done without violating the requirement
that at least one critical point, xloc(a;b), exists. An increase in a also raises xloc(~ a;b)
(from Fact 1), but since xloc(~ a;b) < 1, this can be done without violating the constraint
that xloc(a;b)  1. Since a can be increased without violating the constraints that
xloc(a;b)  1 and exists, ~ a would not meet the requirement of being the upper bound
on the interval of a's such that these constraints are satised. By contrast, if U (x;a;b)
has a single critical point, a cannot be increased further as the function would then
have no critical points. Since U (x;a;b) has a single critical point, it is non-decreasing


















and U(1;a;b) must cross at some point a(b) 2 [0;a].
Finally, Fact 4 implies that on [0;a(b)), x(a;b) = xloc(a;b).
Lemma 2 (i) If b > 1
2 then x(a;b) is strictly increasing on [0;a(b)).





3a(b) = 1 and x(a;b) smoothly increases up to 1.




3a(b) < 1 and x(a;b) explodes up to 1 upon reaching the
critical threshold a(b).
33Proof. The rst claim follows from Fact 1 in the proof of Lemma 1. For the third
claim, note xloc(a;b) is only dened when a  b2
3 and xloc(b2
3 ;b) = 1
b. Fact 1 then implies
the b > 1 claim. For the second claim, now suppose b  1. Then xloc(b2
3 ;b) = 1
b  1 and
it is also the inection point. In general the inection point is b
3a. Thus as a decreases
from b2
3 , the inection point is increasing. In particular, it remains above 1. However,





is if both xloc(a(b);b) and the inection point are both strictly smaller than 1. Thus,
there is no explosion.
Lemma 3 If b > 1
2 then the quantities bx(a;b)   ax2(a;b) and x(a;b)(bx(a;b)  









































This shows bx(a;b)   ax2(a;b) is increasing. Since x(a;b) is positive and increasing
as well, so x(a;b)(bx(a;b)   ax2(a;b)) is also increasing.
Proof of Proposition 1
The principal's objective function is
p1+p2
2 (1   (p1 + p2) + p1p2s). We rst wish to
prove that p1 = p2: Fix a given X = p1 + p2. The term p1p2s is maximized, for a
given X, by setting p1 = p2. The other terms in the objective function are all terms
in X. Thus, we have p1 = p2. This allows us to apply Lemmas 1, 2 and 3 with
x =
p1+p2
2 ; statements (i), (ii) and (iii) are essentially transcriptions of these three
Lemmas, respectively. The only dierence is that at the critical synergy level, we now
discriminate between the two optimal eorts in accordance with Assumption 1.










More generally, holding synergy xed, an increase in agent i's relative inuence means
both increasing "ij and decreasing "ji. This causes both an increase in w
i and a decrease
in w
j, which proves (v).
The proof of part (vi) is as follows. We use a dot to denote the derivative with
respect to "ij.
_ w
j = _ p   2"ijp




p p(1   2p + s
p
2) ) 1   4p
 + 3sp
2 = 0 )  4 _ p + 6sp
 _ p + 3p
2 = 0







Since _ p > 0, this means that, when s <  s, _ w
j and 6"ijp   1 have the same sign.
Equation (8) follows immediately. Turning to the expected wage, we have:
_ pw
j = 2p
 _ p   3"ijp
2 _ p   p
3
 4 _ p + 6sp
 _ p + 3p
2 = 0 ) p
  
 4 _ p + 6sp
 _ p + 3p
2
= 0
A linear combination of the two gives us
_ pw
j = 3"ijp





Finally, for part (vii), the rst-order condition yields: w1 = p1 (1   "21p2). Thus,
agent 1's utility is given by:















2 (1   "21p)
where p = p1 + p2, and similarly U2 = 3
4p2 (1   "12p). Hence U1 > U2 if and only if
"12 > "21.
Proof of Proposition 2







3(s) 2 arg max
p1;p2;p32[0;1]
Ap1p2 + Bp1p3 + Cp2p3 (20)
The rst-order conditions which characterize interior solutions to this convex problem
are captured by equation (10). This proves (i).
Since the maximization problem of equation (20) is convex, the optimal eort prole
will satisfy the ratios of equation (11) so long as:
1. Each synergy component is strictly smaller than the sum of the other two.
2. The restriction of each eort being no greater than 1 is nonbinding.
Condition 1 is assumed in this lemma and condition 2 holds if synergy is suciently
small. Suppose then that synergy is small. Call by p the highest eort of the optimal
eort prole. Then there exists 1     > 0 such that the other two eorts are p
and p. Assume without loss of generality that agent 1's eort is highest, agent 2's
eort is  times agent 1's eort and agent 3's eort is  times agent 1's eort. Then
the principal's maximization problem becomes
p
 2 arg max
p2[0;1]
(1 +  + )p
 
1   (1 +  + )p + (A + B + C)p
2
.
Statement (ii) now follows from Lemma 1. Statement (iii) follows from Lemma 3.
Holding the synergy prole xed, an increase in agent i's relative inuence means
both an increase of at least one element of f"ijgj6=i and a corresponding decrease of
some elements in f"jigj6=i. This causes an increase in w
i and a decrease in at least one
element of fw
jgj6=i provided the eort prole is interior. p28, nal paragraph of the
proof of proposition 2. Moreover, since (p1;p2;p3) is a function of the synergy prole
only, it is unaected by changes in relative inuence and so p is unchanged. Statement
(iv) now follows.
Proof of Proposition 3
Without loss of generality, suppose A > B  C and A  B + C. Looking at
the convex problem of equation (20), it is clear that p
3 = 0. But then the principal's
maximization problem becomes symmetric in p1 and p2 and there is nontrivial synergy
between agents 1 and 2. The statement in the proposition then follows from the
preliminary two-agent case.
36Proof of Corollary 1

















Equation (10) and the corollary's assumption about the inuence parameters imply
that the quantity inside the parentheses is the same for all i. The result now follows
immediately.
Proof of Proposition 5
The proof is essentially the same as in Proposition 1.
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